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Abstract
The purpose of this paper was to investigate the relationship between verbal aggression and uncivil media
attention on political flaming. More specifically, this paper examines whether the use of uncivil media pro-
gramming is associated with the perceived acceptability and intention to engage in aggressive online discus-
sions (i.e., online political flaming) and whether this relationship varies by verbal aggression. The results show
that individuals less inclined to engage in aggressive communication tactics (i.e., low in verbal aggression)
become more accepting of flaming and show greater intention to flame as their attention to uncivil media
increases. By contrast, those with comparatively higher levels of verbal aggression show a decrease in ac-
ceptance and intention to flame as their attention to these same media increases.
Introduction
Individuals have greater access to information thanever before, with cable news networks and the Internet
providing access to political news content 24 hours a day. New
technologies also allow people to discuss politics without the
typical constraints associated with face-to-face communica-
tion. Web sites allow readers to become active participants in
the news process by inviting them to comment on stories1 and
discuss important issues with members of the online commu-
nity. However, scholars have pointed out that with these
technological advances people are consuming more supportive
information on partisan outlets.2–4 The concern with these
programs is that they contain large amounts of aggressive,
uncivil discourse.5,6 The prominence of these tactics has led
some to voice concern that these types of programs contribute
to the increasingly partisan environment in which people per-
ceive political opponents with disdain.5–9 Research has shown
that watching uncivil programming creates a toxic political
environment in which the public loses trust and respect for
government institutions and leaders.8,9 Furthermore, research
shows that uncivil media consumption can lead to an increase
in the expression of incivility when expressing political opin-
ions.10 This paper examines whether the use of uncivil cable
TV programming increases the perceived acceptability and
intention to engage in aggressive online discussions (i.e., online
political flaming). Furthermore, it considers whether there is a
mainstreaming effect from watching uncivil media program-
ming on perceived acceptability and intention to engage in
aggressive behaviors among those with different levels of
verbal aggression.
Political flaming and cultivation
Political flaming is a concept based upon online flaming and
centers on aggressive communication around politics in online
spaces. Flaming has been described as ‘‘hostile and aggressive
interactions via text-based computer-mediated communica-
tion.’’11 Simply stated, flaming is a hostile message sent via an
online communication channel (e.g., e-mail, instant messag-
ing, blogging, online discussion groups, etc.). Political flaming
has been shown to be a common occurrence in online
spaces.12 A number of studies have found a large proportion of
online comments include aggressive communication tactics.13
Indeed, up to 30% of comments on online discussion boards
have been categorized as uncivil or impolite.14
One potential way that people learn that aggressive com-
munication strategies are an acceptable way to discuss politics
online is cable news. Recent content analyses showed cable
news programming contains many depictions of verbal ag-
gression.5 This research found that opinion-based news sour-
ces (e.g., cable TV, talk radio, political blogs, and newspaper
columns) include significant amounts of aggressive discourse.5
Thus, research suggests that cable news can often be viewed
as uncivil media programming. Therefore, it is possible that
paying attention to these programs will cultivate beliefs that
using aggressive language when talking politics online is ac-
ceptable behavior. According to Cultivation Theory, television
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may be viewed as a source of maintaining and establishing
conventional standards of beliefs and behaviors.15 These be-
liefs can then manifest themselves in the form of perceived
acceptability and intentions to engage in specific behaviors,
such as negative stereotypes of women and dating percep-
tions.16
Recent cultivation studies also point to relationships be-
tween greater use of television and acceptance of aggressive
communication and physical behaviors. Researchers have
found that heavy television use (e.g., crime dramas and soap
operas) is correlated with greater acceptance of the rape
myth (i.e., false accusations of rape and promiscuity).17
Some research has also shown that media content may teach
young adolescents and children that the use of verbal ag-
gression is an acceptable way to deal with rejection of inti-
macy from a potential relational partner.18 Researchers have
also found that antisocial media consumption (i.e., media that
contains violence, sex, and drug abuse) contributed to cyber-
bullying behaviors.19 The above-mentioned research suggests
that there could be a relationship between viewing uncivil
media programming and the perceived acceptability of flam-
ing. Given the results of a recent content analysis5 that showed
cable news programming contains many depictions of verbal
aggression, it is possible that paying attention to these pro-
grams will cultivate beliefs that engaging in verbally ag-
gressive behaviors is acceptable behavior, and increase the
likelihood of using aggressive communication tactics when
others challenge one’s opinions. Thus, based on the research
presented, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H1: There is a positive relationship between attention to
uncivil media programs and (a) flaming acceptability and
(b) intention to engage in political flaming.
Mainstreaming
A unique contribution of cultivation research is the main-
streaming hypothesis. The rationale behind mainstreaming is
that heavy use of television can override differences between
individuals (e.g., men vs. women, Democrats vs. Repub-
licans). Thus, mainstreaming pushes dissimilar groups of
individuals toward a middle position or a mainstreamed av-
erage.20 For example, research has found that heavy televi-
sion viewing among liberals and conservatives brought them
toward similar viewpoints regarding issues such as social
spending, taxes, and abortion.21 Researchers have also found
that adolescents with both high and low socioeconomic status
(SES) held similar levels of authoritarianism when their use
of media was high.22 The results of these studies20,21 show
conditional effects of media use across political ideologies
(e.g., liberal, moderate, and conservative) and demographic
variables (e.g., age, SES, or sex).22 To examine the main-
streaming hypothesis, we have decided to look at the trait
variable of verbal aggression. Since flaming is inherently an
expression of aggression through verbal text, verbal aggres-
sion would be a key characteristic that predicts flaming be-
haviors. Past research has also used verbal aggression as an
interaction variable between aggressive media exposure and
the activation of aggressive thoughts.23 Thus, the present
study begins by examining the potential relationship between
verbal aggression and the flaming outcomes. It then moves on
to examine whether people with different levels of verbal
aggression move to a similar point in their beliefs about
flaming the more they pay attention to uncivil media.
Verbal aggression
Overall, verbal aggression is considered a threat to civil
public discourse.24 Verbal aggression is a person’s tendency
to attack another person’s self-concept instead of attacking
the person’s opinion or argument.25 Studies have shown a
direct relationship between verbal aggression and the per-
ceived acceptability of using verbally aggressive tactics and
intention to engage in verbally aggressive behaviors.26 In-
deed, individuals who score high on aggressive personality
measures were more likely to describe an ambiguous social
situation with aggressive language in a sentence completion
task.27 This finding occurred regardless of whether individ-
uals had previously viewed aggressive behaviors as being
negatively reinforced. Thus, regardless of positive or nega-
tive reinforcement, individuals with high trait aggression
often view hostility as a reasonable course of action. As this
research indicates, verbal aggression should be associated
with perceived acceptability of flaming and the intention to
flame when talking politics online. Accordingly, the fol-
lowing hypothesis was formulated:
H2: There will be a positive relationship between verbal
aggression and (a) flaming acceptability and (b) intention to
engage in political flaming.
While the above-formulated hypothesis is important to
extend the current research in terms of main effects, the use of
hostile cable programing may reduce the differences between
individuals with high and low levels of verbal aggression. In
essence, as people with low and high levels of verbal ag-
gression consume uncivil media, they may hold similar views
about the use of aggressive communication tactics when
discussing politics online. Research has examined how spe-
cific personality traits (e.g., trait anxiety, sensation seeking,
and psychoticism) moderated the cultivation effects of tele-
vision use on perceptions of violence.28 This study showed
that individuals who scored lower on trait anxiety and psy-
choticism were more likely to view society as violent as
television use increased.28 The research of Nabi and Riddle
suggests that greater use of television led those with high and
low levels of trait anxiety to move toward a similar point on
their estimates of violence in society.28 As such, individual
traits may moderate the main effect of uncivil media attention.
Trait verbal aggression could serve as a potentially important
moderating variable between uncivil media attention and
measures of aggression. For instance, it could be that indi-
viduals high in verbal aggression might experience a cathartic
effect through uncivil media exposure, while those low in
verbal aggression become primed with uncivil discourse. A
cathartic effect occurs when individuals build up negative
emotions (including aggression) that can then be released
through the expression of their negative emotions.29 Fur-
thermore, new media options such as texting, instant mes-
saging, and video games can aid in this process by giving
individuals an outlet to express negativity, thereby releasing
built-up emotions. Research has found evidence that social
media spaces such as instant messaging can be used to release
negative emotions and/or emotional distress.30 Other re-
search, albeit in a different media contexts (i.e., video games)
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has shown that individuals will seek out violent media for a
cathartic effect.31 Thus, uncivil media attention can lead those
with different levels of certain trait variables toward similar
estimates of violence in society. Therefore, it is proposed that
there will be an interaction in which uncivil cable news use
leads people with different levels of verbal aggression to
converge toward holding views about political flaming.
H3: There will be a mainstreaming effect, such that greater
attention to uncivil media programs leads those with high
and low levels of verbal aggression to show similar levels
of (a) flaming acceptability and (b) intention to engage in
political flaming.
Methods
Data
The data used to test the proposed hypotheses were ob-
tained from a survey of political blog readers in the fall of
2011. This purposive sample was obtained by sending out
invitations to moderators for the top 100 political blogs listed
on Technorati.com, which indexes the most popular blogs on
the Internet by category. The moderators were asked to post
the link on their blogs, along with a short statement de-
scribing the purpose and scope of the survey, which was to
examine Internet usage habits. Readers of blogs were sur-
veyed because they are likely to engage in online political
discussions and watch cable news. Other researchers have
used this strategy of surveying blog readers in the past with
success.32,33 The survey was posted on three blogs and was
accessed 472 times. However, only 293 individuals com-
pleted the survey in its entirety.
Independent variable
Uncivil media attention. An index of uncivil media at-
tention was created using participants’ responses to ques-
tions asking how much attention they paid to political stories
when watching partisan programs on MSNBC and Fox News
(e.g., Countdown with Keith Olbermann, The Rachel Maddow
Show, The Ed Show, The LastWord with Laurence O’Donnell,
Hannity, The O’Reilly Factor, and On The Record with
Greta VanSusteren) on a 5-point scale where 0 = ‘‘none’’ and
4 = ‘‘a great deal’’ (M = 0.78, SD = 0.79, a= 0.83). These
programs have been used in prior research to examine hostile
communication tactics.5 For instance, researchers have used
these types of programs when examining moral outrage and
uncivil media programs (Hannity & Countdown with Keith
Olbermann).5 Attention was the focus because researchers
have noted it is a better measure than using media exposure
when assessing cognitive and behavioral effects.34,35 More-
over, previous studies have used attention within a cultiva-
tion framework.36
Moderating variable
Verbal aggression. To measure trait verbal aggression,37
the 10-item verbal aggression index25 was employed using a
5-point scale where 1= ‘‘strongly disagree’’ and 5= ‘‘strongly
agree’’ (M= 1.98, SD= 0.67, a= 0.87). Example items include
statements such as ‘‘When individuals are very stubborn, I use
insults to soften the stubbornness’’ and ‘‘If individuals I am
trying to influence really deserve it, I attack their character.’’
Dependent variables
Flaming acceptability. Eight items were averaged together
to create the measure of flaming acceptability12 on a 5-point
scale ranging from 1= ‘‘strongly disagree’’ to 5= ‘‘strongly
agree’’ (M= 2.11, SD= 0.79, a= 0.91). Example items include
statements such as ‘‘I enjoy attacking people online with
whom I disagree,’’ ‘‘It’s acceptable to insult people who attack
your beliefs,’’ ‘‘It’s acceptable to say aggressive things to
people online when discussing politics,’’ and ‘‘It’s acceptable
to say aggressive things to people who hold different opinions
from your own.’’
Political flaming intention. Participants were asked to in-
dicate how likely they were to respond in an aggressive manner
to online comments that disagreed with their position, using a
5-point scale ranging from 1= ‘‘very unlikely’’ to 5= ‘‘very
likely’’ (M= 1.35, SD= 0.56, a= 0.67). The items asked re-
spondents how likely they were to respond with an insult, to
swear at the individual, or to use all caps in the message.
Control variables
Several control variables were also included to account for
the unique variance of each of these variables. Indeed, pre-
vious research has noted that some of these variables (e.g.,
sex23,38) correlate with aggressive outcomes. Therefore, the
following variables were included in the regression model.
Media attention. A measure of attention to traditional
media use was included in the regression models. Traditional
media attention was assessed by asking individuals how
much attention they pay to political stories using a 5-point
scale ranging from 0 = ‘‘none’’ to 4 = ‘‘a great deal’’ when
watching news programming on networks such as ABC,
CBS, or NBC (M = 1.23, SD= 1.21) and when reading a
newspaper, either in print or online (M = 2.97, SD = 1.21).
Political ideology. Political ideology was measured with
a single item asking participants their political ideology
on a 7-point scale ranging from 1= ‘‘strongly liberal’’ to 7=
‘‘strongly conservative’’ (M= 1.85, SD= 1.07).
Political interest. Political interest was measured with
one item asking respondents how much they agreed with the
statement ‘‘I am interested in politics’’ on a 5-point scale
where 1= ‘‘strongly disagree’’ and 5 = ‘‘strongly agree’’
(M= 4.70, SD = 0.55).
Demographics. Respondents reported their age in years
(M=44.86, SD= 12.51). Education was measured with one
item that asked respondents their level of education on an 8-
point scale that ranged from 1= ‘‘less than a high school edu-
cation’’ to 8= ‘‘a professional degree’’ (M= 5.27, SD=1.53 [4
year college degree]). Household income was measured with
one item using a 15-point scale that ranged from <$20,000 a
year to >$150,000 a year (M=7.61, SD= 4.41 [$70,000–
79,999]). Finally, sex was measured with a single question
asking respondents to report their biological sex (66.5% male).
Data analysis
To analyze these data, a series of OLS regression models
were run predicting our two dependent variables. To test the
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interaction hypotheses, a moderated multiple regression was
run. To do so, a media use by verbal aggression term was
created and that interaction term was entered into the re-
gression models, which included all controls and main effect
variables (see Table 1).
Results
Hypotheses 1a and 1b examined the relationship between
uncivil media attention and flaming acceptability and political
flaming intentions. These hypotheses were not supported. The
results show that there is no relationship between attention to
partisan media outlets and flaming acceptability (B= - 0.060,
SE= 0.052, p> 0.05) or intention to flame (B= 0.010, SE=
0.040, p> 0.05). However, the analysis does support hypoth-
eses 2a and 2b. Specifically, the analysis shows that higher
verbal aggression was associated with people believing that
flaming is an acceptable behavior (B = 0.723, SE = 0.056,
p < 0.05) and associated with greater intention to engage in
political flaming (B = 0.454, SE = 0.043, p < 0.05).
Next, Hypotheses 3a and 3b were examined, which pre-
dicted a mainstreaming effect of television use on flaming
acceptability and flaming intentions. The results show support
for both of these hypotheses. Specifically, the analysis shows
a statistically significant verbal aggression by media attention
interaction in the predicted direction for Hypothesis 3a (B=
–0.156, SE= 0.073, p< 0.05; see Fig. 1). The graphed inter-
action in Figure 1 indicates that at low levels of uncivil media
attention, high levels of verbal aggression are associated with
greater acceptance for political flaming, while those indi-
viduals with low levels of verbal aggression show less ac-
ceptance for political flaming. However, as people consume
uncivil media, their views on the acceptability of political
flaming converge. Specifically, those with high levels of
verbal aggression show lower levels of acceptance for polit-
ical flaming as their attention of uncivil media increases. By
contrast, those with low levels of verbal aggression show
higher levels of acceptance for political flaming as their at-
tention of uncivil media increases. The results also showed a
significant interaction for flaming intentions, which supports
Hypothesis 3b (B= - 0.163, SE= 0.056, p< 0.01). The results
indicate that higher levels of verbal aggression are associated
with greater intention to engage in political flaming, while
those individuals with low levels of verbal aggression show
lower levels of intention to engage in political flaming. As the
graphed interaction shows (see Fig. 2), consuming uncivil
media leads individuals with different levels of verbal ag-
gression to converge to a similar point. Those with high levels
of verbal aggression show lower levels of intention to flame
as their attention to uncivil media increases. By contrast,
those with low levels of verbal aggression show an increase in
their intention to engage in political flaming as their use of
uncivil media increases.
Discussion
This study examined the relationship between attention to
uncivil political media and both perceived acceptability
of and intention to engage in political flaming. The results
Table 1. Regression Predicting Flaming Outcomes
Flaming
acceptability
upon entry, B
Flaming
behavior
intention
upon entry, B
Age 0.005 (0.003) 0.000 (0.002)
Education 0.023 (0.024) 0.028 (0.019)
Sex - 0.253 (0.079)** 0.020 (0.060)
Income 0.005 (0.009) - 0.005 (0.007)
Political ideology - 0.045 (0.035) - 0.008 (0.027)
Political interest 0.168 (0.066)* 0.075 (0.051)
Network news use 0.017 (0.031) 0.036 (0.024)
Newspaper use 0.011 (0.037) 0.031 (0.028)
Verbal aggression 0.723 (0.056)*** 0.454 (0.043)***
R2 0.421*** 0.311***
Uncivil media use - 0.060 (0.052) 0.010 (0.040)
DR2 0.001 0.000
Verb aggression
by uncivil
media use
- 0.156 (0.073)* - 0.163 (0.056)**
DR2 0.009* 0.020**
R2 0.433*** 0.330***
Adj R2 0.411*** 0.304***
Note: Regression coefficients are unstandardized with standard
errors in parentheses. The F test for the flaming acceptability model
and the behavioral intention models were significant. Acceptabil-
ity =F(11, 296) = 23.182, p < 0.001; Intention =F(11, 294)= 14.268,
p < 0.001.
*p < 0.05; **p< 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
FIG. 1. Uncivil media use by
verbal aggression interaction
predicting flaming acceptability.
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showed no direct relationship between paying attention to
uncivil media and political flaming acceptability or flaming
intentions. The results did show that there is a strong rela-
tionship between verbal aggression and both of the flaming
outcome variables. The analysis also found a convergent
uncivil media attention by verbal aggression interaction. The
findings demonstrate that people with different levels of
verbal aggression converge to a similar point on both the
flaming outcome variables as their use of uncivil media in-
creases. This pattern of results supports the proposed main-
streaming hypotheses, which posited that individuals high
and low in trait verbal aggression would have similar views
on the acceptability of flaming and intention to flame, as they
consume more uncivil media. One way to explain this in-
teraction could be through a cathartic effect. It could be that
those individuals high in verbal aggression experienced a
cathartic effect as a result of viewing uncivil media, while
those individuals low in trait verbal aggression were primed
with aggressive tactics over time. Thus, increased viewing of
uncivil media primed them with associations of political
discussion and verbal aggression.
The findings of this study apply to the democratic norms of
political discussion. The idealized goal of democratic theo-
rists is to have people engage in lengthy civil discussions that
result in the best possible decision.39,40 A general concern
about uncivil content is the nefarious effect it has on levels of
institutional trust8 and political engagement,9,10 which would
be harmful to the political process and counter to the ideals of
democracy. These findings provide more nuance to the po-
tential negative effects of uncivil media on politics, and
suggest that exposure to uncivil media does not have a uni-
form negative impact on citizens. The findings show that
these relationships between uncivil media and flaming ac-
ceptability and intentions differ based on verbal aggression.
These results are similar to previous research showing the
conditional effects of media based on individual-level vari-
ables.41,42 Previous research has shown that SES moderates
the effects of horse race coverage on people’s level of po-
litical cynicism41 and the effects of news use on knowledge.42
Overall, the findings highlight the importance of looking
beyond the main effects of media use. Given that the results
show aggressive media may decrease aggressive behaviors
among individuals most likely to use aggressive verbal tac-
tics (i.e., those high in verbal aggression), it is possible that
more civil debates on cable news, and the media more gen-
erally, would further reduce aggression among frequent
viewers of political media outlets. However, results showing
that media use increases aggressive tendencies among those
with lower levels of verbal aggression signifies reason for
concern. Civil discourse may help to curb political flaming
by reducing the extent to which flaming occurs in online
spaces centered around politics.
Future Directions and Limitations
Future studies should consider experimental design in order
to test how civil media discourse affects verbal aggression
and actual flaming behaviors. The confines of an experiment
would also allow for a better assessment of whether these
different types of media (i.e., civil or uncivil) cause changes
in verbally aggressive outcome variables (i.e., flaming). Fu-
ture studies could also look toward Social Identity Theory to
examine potential differences in flaming behaviors toward
ingroup and outgroup members. In essence, rewarding attacks
on an outgroup could reinforce the acceptability of flaming for
those who hold opposing views. Moreover, this effect could
increase among those who regard membership in a particular
group as central to their identity. Finally, researchers should
specifically include name-calling as an index measure of po-
litical flaming. Research has indicated that name-calling is
common occurrence of uncivil discourse online.43
Despite the contribution of the present study, some limi-
tations may have affected the results. Foremost, the study
uses a purposive sample, which prevents the results from
being generalized to the larger population. It was felt nec-
essary to survey frequent consumers of political information
via the Internet. However, the sample is not representative of
the larger population, which decreases the extent to which it
can be said that these results apply to the wider U.S. popu-
lation. Thus, future research should examine demographic
groups related to sex and political ideology that are more
representative of the population.
FIG. 2. Uncivil media use
by verbal aggression interaction
predicting flaming intention.
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Second, relying on blogs to post the survey contributed to
the sample being more liberal than the populations of the
typical consumer of online political content. One reason for
the lack of participation among conservative bloggers could
be conservatives’ lack of trust in academia.44 In fact, certain
academics have even gone as far as stating outright hatred for
the conservative right.45 Overall, this could explain why
conservatives do not trust academic institutions. Another
weakness of this study is the use of cross-sectional data.
Using this type of data prevents any causal claims being made
about media use and the measures of flaming acceptability
and intention. This issue could be dealt with using experi-
mental methods or collecting multiple waves of survey data.
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